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This thesis contains a brief overview of past develop-
ments in command and control, and applies organizational
theory to the design of systems for tactical command and
control, specifically within the context of the Fleet Battle
Group. By applying Ashby's theory of requisite variety and
Mintzberg' s five coordinating mechanisms, a general model of
tactical warfare is provided. The author proposes a
balanced application of the five coordinating mechanisms to
the problems of command and control within the battle group,
or other tactical combatant organization.
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Individual experts may differ with these opinions and
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I. THE PROBLEM OF FLEET COMMAND AND CONTROL
go about it, what we need. or for that matter what the
words "Command and Control are intended to imply.
[Ref. 1: p. 1]
In recent years there has been great emphasis on the
development of a command and control theory in order to
answer the doubts raised by Captain W. S. Whaley in the above
statement. Much of this work has been done in the fields of
operations research, cybernetics and computer science.
Recently, attention has also focused on the contribution
that may be made from studies in organizational control
theory. In this thesis, the author hopes to apply certain
theories of organizational control to" the problems of C2,
including elements in the areas of personnel, procedures,
equipment and training that contribute to the overall C2
environment.
First, the author will give a brief background
concerning past work in command and control, with an
emphasis on problems encountered in information processing
and communications. From there, an examination will be made
of principles of cybernetic and organizational control
theory which will form the theoretical basis for the
development of an organizational model for command and
control. Once this foundation is laid, specific
relationships to military tactical operations will be
delineated, leading to the formulation of the author's
concept of organizational control in a combat environment,
which is called the Balanced Concept. This model will be
examined in the light of naval battle group operations, in
an attempt to give specific examples of its potential
contribution to the body of work presently available in
command and control theory.
A. BACKGROUND
Throughout history, the function of command has become
an increasingly more complex part of a nation's warfighting
capability. In the early history of combat, a commander's
place was at the head of a massed body, leading it into the
fray. In the present and future, the commander sits among a
maze of electronic sensory and communications equipment,
controlling forces spread over many hundreds of miles. From
those early beginnings to the present, command and control
has undergone constant metamorphoses, and will continue to
do so. In examining the history of command in war, Martin
van Creveld [ Ref . 2: pp. 1-2] attributes the growth of the
C2 problem to five interrelated factors:
1. Increased demands on the systems
2. Advances in technology which multiplied the means
available for command and control systems
3. Changes in command processes due to the first two
factors
4. Advances in weapons technology which have increased
the vulnerability of command systems
5. The rise in cost due to all of the above factors
To the last two factors can be attributed the general
trend of command and control in the United States over the
past forty years. The economic influence has meant that the
balance of the defense budget in the United States has been
spent on weapons and delivery systems rather than the
command systems to coordinate and improve their use. The
influence of the weapons systems themselves is apparent in
the increase in the size of the battlefield that superior
accuracy and ranges produce. But there is an event of
greater significance which has shaped the general trend of
thought in command and control since the end of World War
1 1 --the detonation of the atomic bomb and the development of
a nuclear strategy.
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B. EFFECTS OF THE NUCLEAR AGE
In examining modern command and control at both the
strategic and and tactical levels, one is immediately
confronted by the problem of control and flexibility in a
nuclear society. First, there must be sufficient control
over the armed forces to prevent any action that might lead
to a nuclear war, particularly limiting the possibility of a
nuclear detonation. Simultaneously, there must be the
flexibility in the force structure to meet a threat at any
time or place in the world.
The fear of nuclear war has been a hallmark of work in
the field of command and control in the last forty years.
In order to deter the enemy from threatening the United
States, a workable but economically feasible solution had to
be developed. Generally speaking, the bomb was cheaper than
a large conventional armed force. Unfortunately, reliance
on a nuclear solution was a two-edged sword--the detonation
of nuclear weapons could be as detrimental to the user, in
the long run, as to the enemy. For this reason, the first
emphasis in post-World War II command and control was to
restrict the use of these weapons by providing a means
whereby the appropriate orders would be centralized in the
hands of the National Command Authority, yet issued in a
timely fashion.
This orientation towards centralized, downward control
at the strategic level, combined with recent perceptions
concerning political accountability and the lack of
authentic tactical command experience available during the
past twenty-five years, appears to have led to an emphasis
on the development of technology to provide the same type of
centralization at the tactical level. In the author's
opinion, it is in tactical warfare that the conflict between
flexibility and control truly begins.
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C. CONTROL VS. FLEXIBILITY
In order to design a command and control system for
tactical use, the characteristics of tactical-level warfare
should be examined to provide a framework within which the
system must operate. Though this conflict will be analyzed
in more detail at a later point in this thesis, some general
statements can be made at this point. In the author's
opinion, tactical-level warfare is characterized by the
following:
1. An increasingly shortened time between events as the
operation progresses
2. An increase over time in the level of variety of
events
3. A high level of confusion, due to an increase in
information reporting combined with a decrease in
information content
4. Communications breakdowns resulting from damage and/or
interference
5. Alterations of the original plan of action, caused by
damage to the force, new estimates and intelligence,
and/or inadequacy of the plan.
From this it can be seen that the force and its command
and control system must have sufficient flexibility to
respond to its changing environment and provide alternative
control methods to meet its changing needs. In other words,
the system should eliminate the apparent conflict between
flexibility and control and provide flexibility of control.
A brief review of past development indicates that previous
C2 design, with its emphasis on centralized control, has
concentrated primarily on the technological, or hardware,
aspects of development. But as van Creveld points out
[ Ref . 2: p. 262], command systems consist of organizations
and procedures as well as the technical means.
In this thesis the author intends to provide a new
orientation towards the development of command and control
systems, by using an organizational approach to the study of
control. Command is a process that operates within an
organization or force structure, and there is more than one
12
method available for control of that structure. By
examining the most serious problems facing C2 today and
defining the situation in which it must function, some new
possibilities for solutions may be obtained by the
organizational approach.
A number of different models have been developed to
define the problem of control at all levels. Major George
Orr [ Ref . 3] dicusses some of these in his examination of
combat operations C3I (see Figures 1.1 - 1.3). Each model,
from Boyd's 0-O-D-A loop to Orr's Conceptual Combat
Operations Process model, can be roughly generalized as
consisting of information input, processing of the
information, decision-making by the commander based on that
information, and communication of the decision to the forces
that will implement it. In these models, the
decision-making function could be considered to be internal
to the commander and the implementation function considered
internal to the assigned forces. Looked at in this fashion,
the potential areas for distortion, bottlenecks or
breakdowns in the system appear to be in the information
gathering/processing function and the communication
function. In fact, the goal of present C2 research and
system development, when viewed in the context of the
previously mentioned models, has been concentrated on these
two problem areas. What should be pointed out here, is that
these models are what will be called static--they divorce
the decision-making process from the context of the battle--
and, in addition, are oriented towards a centralized,
directly controlled concept. For the moment, however, a
discussion of the problems in the information and
communication functions are apropos.
D. THE PROBLEM OF INFORMATION
As Bernard Bass has observed [Ref. 4: p. 62], effective














Figure 1.1 Boyd's O-O-D-A Loop.
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information. The advent of the computer age has certainly
enhanced our ability to collect information, but as van
Creveld states [ Ref . 2: p. 3], the explosion in data
collection has increased the difficulty of interpreting it
for use in decision-making. Specifically,
The more the available information, however, the longer
the time needed to process it, and the greater the
danger of failing to distinguish between the relevant
and the irrelevant, the important and the unimportant,
the reliable and the unreliable, the true and the false.
[Ref. 2: p. 276]
The study of information in organizational
decision-making has led to a number of discoveries
concerning its treatment and interpretation. Doctor Bass
mentions three specific conclusions [Ref. 4: pp. 62-65].
First, much information may be irrelevant to the decision.
Second, many times the decision has been made or a number of
assumptions arrived at prior to the search. In this case,
the information sought is either interpreted in accordance
with the decision or assumptions, or is sought specifically
to support them. Last, people see and hear what they expect
to see and hear; they tend to classify information according
to stereotypes. More clearly, past information or past
experience will color the view of the new data--it may be
misperceived as "more of the same.
"
Van Creveld describes these phenomena as what could be
paraphrased as the "99 and 1 percents. " [Ref. 2: p. 7] In
practice, most information is of inconsistent value. The 99
percent of it may disappear without trace, due to equipment
failures, loss or other breakdowns of the system, whereas
the remaining 1 percent may affect operations profoundly.
In fact, the 1 percent may or, more importantly, may not be
of value without the other 99 percent.
Finally, there is the effect of time on the value of





































Figure 1.2 Lawson's Combat Process Model.
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delay in the reception of data may mean that a decision is
based upon old, no longer accurate information. By the same
token, when data is coming in at a rapid pace, and the
average time between events is shortened, the receipt of
information may outstrip the decision-maker's ability to
digest it and make a rational decision. In fact, as Bass
discusses [ Ref . 4: p. 63], a series of simulated complex
military decision experiments conducted by Streufert in 1978
found that information received as rarely as every six
minutes or as frequently as every two resulted in a
significantly lower quality of decision-making. The optimum
time between receptions was found to be, on the average,
every three minutes.
E. THE PROBLEM OF COMMUNICATIONS
Related to information gathering and processing, because
it is the means whereby much of the information is obtained,
are the difficulties of communications. This is frequently
viewed as a technical problem, and it is in that sense that
it will be examined here.
First of all, increasing use of the electromagnetic
spectrum for communications and sensor operation has been
the source of the growing field of electronic warfare. New,
modern combat systems place greater reliance on
electromagnetic superiority. Electromagnetic emissions and
signatures facilitate location and identification of the
enemy, while jamming and other methods of electronic warfare
may degrade or prevent the use of communications and sensor
equipment [Ref. 5]. During combat, conventional damage to
electrical systems, antennae, connecting wire, or entire
electronic units or compartments may also result in serious
deterioration or loss of communication between the commander
and his forces.
In nuclear warfare, whether strategic or tactical, there




























Figure 1. 3 Conceptual Combat Operations Process Model.
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communications occuring through ionizing radiation. Joseph
Rotblat [ Ref . 6: pp. 18-19] has discussed the intense
ionization of the air caused by radiation, one consequence
of which is a short, powerful pulse of electromagnetic
radiation, similar to radio waves, but with an amplitude
millions of times stronger and covering a continuous
spectrum of wavelengths. This pulse may interfere with and
cause surges and permanent damage to electrical equipment,
particularly solid state devices. According to Samuel
Glasstone [Ref. 7: pp. 502,506], there are two principal
effects of a nuclear explosion: the electromagnetic pulse
(EMP) itself, and disturbance of electromagnetic waves, such
as those used in communications and sensor equipment,
through alterations to the electrical properties of the
atmosphere. The electromagnetic wave disturbance may cause
a blackout of radio, radar and related systems for several
hours. A general description of the effect of the
disruption is that the density of electrons in the air is
greatly increased, affecting electromagnetic signals in two
ways. First, under suitable conditions, energy can be
removed from the wave, resulting in an attenuated signal
and, second, a wavefront traveling from one area to another
will be refracted--in other words, its direction of
propagation will be changed. Thus a nuclear explosion
affects command and control through the communications and
sensor systems that form part of the C2 network.
F. CONCLUSIONS
As has been discussed, during the past forty years,
command and control development has been concentrated on
producing centralized systems, heavily dependent upon
sophisticated technology. As control of strategic nuclear
systems was the paramount goal of early work in the field,
this emphasis is neither surprising nor inappropriate.
However, as the field of study broadened to include tactical
19
systems, concepts for command and control do not appear to
have expanded commensurately. Though organizational
structures, such as the Navy's Combined Warfare Concept,
have been designed with the problems of tactical warfare in
mind, is the author's opinion that most systems development
has continued to search for technological solutions to the
problems of information and communication.
Unfortunately, as van Creveld puts it,
Present day military forces. for all the imposing array
of electronic gadgetry at their disposal, give no
evidence whatsoever of being one whit more capable of
dealing with the information needed for the command
process than were their predecessors a century or even a
millenium ago. [ Ref . 2: p. 265]
He continues, averring that technology is merely one part of
the general environment of command; to allow it to dictate
its structure and functioning is to become the slave of
technology and, moreover, to lose sight of what command
truly is. His recommendation, with which the author
concurs, is that one must recognize the limitations of
"state of the art" and discover ways, specifically in
training, doctrine and organization, of compensating for
those limitations. In brief, one must, "instead of
confining one's actions to what available technology can do,
. . . understand what it cannot do and then proceed to do it
nevertheless." [Ref. 2: p. 275]
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II. VARIETY 1M WARFARE
A. ASHBY AND REQUISITE VARIETY
To begin an analysis of tactical warfare, one must deal
with what is frequently termed the fog, or the uncertainty,
of combat. It is the author's contention that this
uncertainty is the result of the variety of warfare, some of
the elements of which will be detailed at a later point in
this paper. Before beginning such a discussion, a framework
for dealing with variety is in order. One such framework
may be found in cybernetic, or control, theory.
W. R. Ashby first postulated the law of requisite variety
in his An Introduction to Cybernetics . First, he defines a
system as a list of variables, rather than as a thing
[ Ref . 8: p. 40] . An example of a system such as that
defined by Ashby, to which the following paragraph may be
related, is depicted in Figure 2. 1. This loop, developed by
Defense Systems, Incorporated for the Defense Communications
Agency [Ref. 9: p. 2-14], is called the Adaptive Control
Loop.
In general, Ashby characterizes two forces acting on a
system as the variables R, the regulator, and D, the
disturbance. If R' s action or move is unvarying, whatever
D's action, then the number of different outcomes, O, of
these two actions will be only as large as the variety in
D's moves. In this case, D exerts full control over the
situation. If R next uses, or has available, two moves,
then the variety of the outcomes can be reduced to a half
(but not lower). Specifically, "this is the law of
requisite variety . . . only variety in R can force down the
variety due to D; only variety can destroy variety.
"
[Ref. 8: pp. 206-207] In a large system, such as combat,








Figure 2. 1 The Adaptive Control Loop.
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disturbance (or D's) / the main cause of difficulty is the
variety in each of those disturbances that must be regulated
against [ Ref . 8: pp. 244-245].
Although Ashby used this theory within his framework for
design of machines to simulate biological systems, it was
Burton who applied it to the study of organizational
planning [Ref. 10]. Burton characterized present U.S.
organizational planning systems as using the problem-solving
approach: attempting to forecast the future environment, and
making plans within the context of that forecast. A central
issue of Burton's approach is the ability, or lack thereof,
to predict the future environment sufficiently well to
develop an effective plan for implementation. He recommends
use of a control approach, resting upon implications from
Ashby 1 s law of requisite variety, as a supplement to the
development of a single strategy or plan of action.
Put in terms similar to Ashby' s, if the level of variety
in the environment is large, the organization must ensure at
least a matching level of variety in future planning. A
single plan of action leaves the outcome completely a
function of variety in the environment. If the organization
desires greater control over the outcome of its actions, the
variety in its potential actions must be increased. As
Burton states, this planned variety must exceed
environmental variety in order to ensure long-run
organizational viability.
By adopting what Burton calls a "flexible configuration
strategy", or determining how to configure organizational
resources to effectively respond to variety in the future,
the organization becomes more flexible in what it can do; it
can adopt a large set, or umbrella, of alternative potential
activities. More simply, the organization not only has a
plan for what it will do, based on its forecast of the
future, it has also planned for contingencies when its
23
forecast is found to be wrong. According to Burton, the
elements in the organization that include possible avenues
for developing a flexible configuration strategy are:
1. Production processes.
2. Capabilities of individuals at all levels.
3. Organizational inputs.
4. Organizational structure, including variations.
5. Organizational outputs.
Providing flexibility in any, or all, of these areas can
provide the additional flexibility of response in dealing
with a variable environment. It should be pointed out here,
in light of what has been averred concerning the development
of command and control systems, that technology should be
included in only one of these categories—that of production
processes. Already there is the potential for other methods
of approach to the solution of command and control problems.
First, however, some specific sources of variety and
applications of the control approach to warfare should be
examined.
B. VARIETY IN THE THREAT
When planning for variety in warfare, the commander
should first examine the probable intentions and actions of
his adversary. There are a number of factors that may
influence what the opposing commander(s) may do. First of
all, what may be the mission, or missions, the enemy may be
attempting to accomplish? To determine the enemy's most
likely objective, the commander must make use of all
available intelligence to determine the overall goals of the
enemy in making war, and what intermediate objectives will
increase the likelihood of his achieving them. It is at
this point that the possible make-up of the opposing force
comes into play: what assets does the enemy have available
to him, and how do they affect his possible choice of
intermediate objectives? Some missions may be infeasible
24
given a lack of or inadequate distribution of resources, or
poor training in a specific area. Also to be considered are
the possible cultural influences acting on the commander or
his forces; for example, is he more accustomed to close
supervision and limited initiative, or is he given a high
level of independence of action? If the first case is true;
he may choose actions which provide more protection for his
communications systems; if the second, his range of
alternative objectives may be wider, requiring less rear
support and communications. An examination of his operating
procedures, both from intelligence and past observation can
also be a method of determining possible enemy intentions;
e. g. , if an increase in activity on a particular radio net
has preceded certain behaviors in the past, its reappearance
could be a indicator for similar actions in the future.
In general, examining an enemy's overall objectives,
assets, operating procedures, and cultural orientation may
give the commander clues as to the actions he is most likely
to pursue. At the same time, the commander must question
the intelligence that gives him this perspective on his
adversary: is it sufficient, is it reliable, is it accurate,
is it correctly interpreted, and does it take into account
information which may be contradictory? This "examination
of conscience" should take place intensively during planning
and preparatory stages of tactical operations, continuing in
a less broad form as the operation progresses. It's value
is the perspective it gives on the variety of feasible and
probable actions on the part of the enemy, one of the
disturbance factors in this case.
There are other disturbance factors that can influence
both the threat and the force; this could include the
geography of the area of conflict (e.g., chokepoint or open
ocean, shallow or deep), international factors (presence of
hostile or friendly allies, and neutrals), and. weather and
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oceanographic considerations ( electromagnetic propagation
influences, storm damage, thermal layers for submarines).
These may also exert some influence over the options
available to the enemy, and commensurately must affect the
commander's plans for variety.
C. VARIETY IN THE FORCE
Once the probable sources of variety in the enemy and
other disturbance variables is determined, the force
commander can begin to plan his organization or procedures
to counteract the possible disruptions to his overall plan
of action. It should be emphasized here that this approach
does not eliminate the generation of a central plan: it
merely, provides for contingencies in case the plan is based
upon incorrect intelligence or assumptions, or unforeseen
circumstances preclude following it exactly or in its
entirety. Planning for variety is a complementary function
to the standard planning procedures; it gives planned
flexibility to the force.
In applying the control approach to his own actions, the
force commander looks at himself in much the same way he
looks at his opponent. He knows his missions and
objectives. He must also examine the cultural environment
of the force and determine what are its strengths and its
weaknesses. Does it provide a means for countering variety
in enemy actions? His assets must be accounted for and
choices made for optimum distribution against a variety of
threats; in a fleet scenario this includes the possibility
of air, surface, or subsurface action. The effect of
socio-political factors is an area which has come to the
fore since the Vietnam conflict: is the atmosphere such that
certain actions are closed to him because they will cost him
political and moral support his force will need to continue
the conflict to a successful conclusion? Is his force
organized so that it will support his plan and are his
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troops sufficiently trained or experienced to meet the
anticipated threat? Are his operating procedures well-known
to the enemy? A variation in them may confuse his opponent
or, worse, confuse his troops. Does doctrine, as it is
understood by his subordinates, cover the contingencies that
may develop in this operation?
Not only must the commander consider these questions
from his own point of view, he must also consider them from
that of his adversary. In this self-examination he may
identify weaknesses of his own that the enemy may find to be
exploitable, and he must develop methods of protection or
compensation for them. Locating his own weaknesses may
provide clues concerning the optimal targets at which an
enemy may choose to strike.
Once he has determined the most likely sources for
disturbance from all the D factors to be encountered in the
future, the commander may consider their effect on his
force. For example, if the probability for a storm is high,
he may have to consider the damage it might have on the
force, where his maneuvers to avoid it may take him relative
to the enemy, and what actions should be taken if any of his
units are separated. Similar questions should be raised
concerning circumstances occuring during combat that are the
result of enemy action. Here, the theory of requisite
variety may be used in finding solutions to specific
problems, which may come from more than one source. In this
case, it may be applied to the problems of command and
control.
D. VARIETY IN COMMAND AND CONTROL
In view of the theory of requisite variety, present C2
systems should be examined in terms of their possibilities
for failure, and the probable causes of those failures. A
previously cited example is that of communications: its loss
or degradation may be due to factors such as jamming or
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damage from battle or the environment. The question for the
commander, or for those that design the systems he will use,
is whether the system can withstand these disturbances or,
if not, is there a backup or alternative method available
when communications are lost. In looking for this
alternative, methods other than the technological must be
considered, for battle damage to one receiver or transmitter
generally means damage to several others, or to entire
systems. What should be looked for is other,
organizational, methods of control, that can "take over"
when the technical systems fail.
In view of Ashby's work, it can be inferred that there
are other methods of control that do not necessarily rely on
hardware for their implementation. As has already been
stated, Burton recommends examining other elements besides
production processes (which itself includes more than
hardware) for the necessary variety of response; he includes
also individual capabilities, inputs, outputs, and
organizational structure as possible sources. It is
interesting to discover that Burton's five elements have a
rough correspondence with five organizational methods of
control and coordination, as identified by Henry Mintzberg.
The next chapter discusses Mintzberg' s concept of control
and coordination.
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III. MINTZBERG'S APPROACH TO CONTROL/COORD INAT ION
A. ORGANIZATIONS AND CONTROL
According to Mintzberg, every organized activity has two
fundamental and opposing requirements: a division of labor
in tasks small enough to be handled, and the coordination of
those tasks to accomplish the overall purpose. He defines
the organization's structure as "the sum total of the' ways
in which it divides its labor into distinct tasks and then
achieves coordination among them." [ Ref . 11: p. 2] The
means of coordination are called coordinating mechanisms,
which Mintzberg notes as being concerned with control and
communication as well as with coordination. In his
observations of organizations, he has identified five of
these fundamental mechanisms of coordination: direct
supervision, mutual adjustment, standardization of work
processes, standardization of work outputs and
standardization of worker skills [Ref. 11: p. 3]. Each of
these will be defined in their simplest application, and in
their progressive use within a growing organization.
According to Mintzberg, the simplest method of
coordination is mutual adjustment. It is achieved by the
process of informal communication. On its own, it is used
in the most basic of organizations; Mintzberg uses the
example of a few people in a pottery studio. He points out,
however, that it is also used in the most complicated of
organizations, where the means to the end is uncertain and
knowledge develops as the work unfolds; an example here
would be a research and development laboratory.
When the number of people in an organization grows
beyond what mutual adjustment alone can handle, it turns
toward the mechanism of direct supervision. Here one
individual in a unit takes responsibility for the work of
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the others, issuing instructions and monitoring actions. In
these terms, the instructions are specific as to the actions
to be carried out as, for example, when the plays are called
in a football game.
The next three levels of coordination are characterized
by some form of standardization. In effect, the
coordination is achieved by some form of training or
planning, at a level determined before the work is begun.
In its most rigid interpretation, work may continue without
supervision or mutual adjustment. The three basic forms of
standardization are in work processes, work outputs, or work
inputs ( referred to as the skills and knowledge of the
people doing the work). In each case, the work done must
meet predetermined standards.
Standardization of work processes exists when the work
content is specified. The value . of this method of
coordination is particularly evident from Perrow' s work in
information system analysis [ Ref . 12: p. 82]. Perrow
described two aspects of tasks: variability and coping
difficulty. Variability refers to exceptions from the
routine, and ranges from few to many exceptions. Coping
difficulty refers to the amount of search required to find a
successful response to a situation, and is measured from low
to high. As shown in Figure 3.1, the solution to a high
level of coping difficulty is to routinize, or standardize,
as many operations as possible. Standardization of
operations, then, offers a means of reducing coping
difficulty.
Assembly line production, as defined in industrial
engineering, is an example of process standardization.
Instructions on what to do are very specific, and are
carried out repetitively. This requires little supervision
(only as a check) and no informal communication relating to
the work process. Where this method is used, it may be more
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Figure 3. 1 Degrees of Task Routine.
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or less specific, depending upon the job at hand; e. g. , a
purchasing agent may have leeway on the level of bids he can
make, within a range of prices.
Outputs are standardized when the results of the work
are specified. The results must meet certain required
minimum and/or maximum standards, such as product dimensions
or performance. Mintzberg uses the example of a potter
producing pots of a particular size and shape. In this
case, the product of one unit, which may be the inputs of
another, are always such that they will "fit in" perfectly
for any further work: the wedger prepares four pound lumps
of clay that the potter knows will be correct for a certain
size pot.
There are times when neither the work nor its outputs
may be standardized: Mintzberg quotes the context of
colonial empires, which can be applied to almost any
administrative task with workers separated by
.
distance.
Direct supervision may be impeded by lack of sufficient
communications and the work and its outputs are not amenable
to standardization. The solution is to standardize the
worker rather than the work: to specify the level of skill
or training required to perform the work. Other examples of
this method are the actions of doctors, pilots and computer
operators. In this case, the workers need hardly
communicate; they know from training what to expect from
each other, and their knowledge and skill take care of most
of the coordination.
B. THE COORDINATION CONTINUUM
Mintzberg concludes his discussion by stating that the
five coordinating mechanisms tend to fall into a rough order
or continuum, shown in Figure 3.2.
As organizational work becomes more complicated, the
favored means of coordination seems to shift, . . . from
mutual adjustment to direct supervision to
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Figure 3.2 The Coordination Continuum.
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of outputs, or else of skills, finally reverting back to
mutual adjustment. [ Ref . 11: p. 7]
In general, small groups of people adapt to each- other
informally; their means of coordination "across brains"
involves some form of mutual adjustment. As the group grows
larger, informal coordination becomes more difficult, if not
impossible; Mintzberg cites the work of Miller in 1959
[Ref. 11: p. 7], where his observations of coal mining
groups showed that with as many as 41 people, miners were
able to maintain effective operations on an informal basis.
Beyond that number, or with more specific task assignments,
direct supervision became necessary due to a decline in
system efficiency. The need for leadership moves control of
the group to a single individual.
As the complexity of work continues to evolve, control
of work shifts to one of the three forms of standardization.
Where tasks are simple and routine, the work processes
themselves may be the optimum form of standardization. More
complex work may require that the outputs be specified, with
the choice of process left up to the worker. In many cases,
however, outputs are too complex or ambiguous to be subject
to specifications; in this event, the organization must
settle for standardizing the workers' skills.
Unfortunately, there are some tasks in a large
organization that may prove too complex for any form of
standardization: this usually results in a return to the
first method of control, mutual adjustment. As Mintzberg
points out [Ref. 11: p. 8], "sophisticated problem solvers
facing extremely complicated situations must communicate
informally if they are to accomplish their work.
"
C. THE COORDINATION MIX
The previous discussion should not imply that an
organization will use only one coordinating mechanism at a
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time. In fact, most use a mix of all five. Nearly all
modern organizations have some form of leadership (direct
supervision) and informal communications (mutual
adjustment), usually in order to compensate for the problems
arising in the use of standardization. The most automated
of work places have contingencies which must be dealt with:
Mintzberg cites the studies done by Wren in 1967, where a
fully automated electric system lacked an effective
override, resulting in the northeastern blackout of 1965
[Ref. 11: p. 8].
As Mintzberg summarizes, most organizations of any size
make use of standardization where possible, supplementing
with direct supervision or mutual adjustment where
necessary. When direct supervision is not sufficient (e.g.,
when coordination is too complex for one individual), the
organization will turn to mutual coordination. In contrast,
when mutual adjustment cannot solve the problem, due to
disagreement or other problems, direct supervision can be
used [Ref. 11: pp. 2-9].
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IV. MINTZBERG'S METHODS 1M MILITARY APPLICATIONS
Mintzberg's five coordinating mechanisms, as previously
described, would appear superficially to have more
application to civil, business or industrial applications.
The present need is for identification of those mechanisms
with forms that can be used in a military context. Direct
supervision is, of course, readily identifiable; it is the
issuing of more or less specific orders from a superior to a
subordinate. Mutual adjustment or, as it will be referred
to here, mutual coordination, is a multi-layered phenomenon.
It may occur between commanders in a large-scale situation,
or at the lowest level of rank and responsibility. Output
standardization is the specification of the mission or
objectives of an operation or assignment. Standardization
of process is a more multi-dimensional mechanism; it is
achieved through standard operating procedures (SOP's),
operation plans, or through operator training.
Standardization of skills translates into training also, but
at a higher level— training in doctrine. Each of these
mechanisms will now be examined and defined in more detail.
A. DIRECT SUPERVISION
As previously stated, direct supervision involves the
issuing of orders by a superior to a subordinate. Like
mutual coordination, it is multi-layered; e. g. , in a Battle
Group it occurs between the OTC (Officer in Tactical
Command) and his subordinate warfare commanders, and between
the Boatswain's Mate of the Watch of an individual ship and
his bridge watchstanders. The means of issuance of these
orders are varied. They include face-to-face communication,
transmission over voice or hard-copy radio or satellite
circuits, written directives or memoranda, or visual signals
such as semaphore, signal flags or flashing light.
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It is direct supervision in one form or another that has
been most generally used in the design of models for command
and control theory. Boyd's 0-O-D-A Loop and Lawson's Combat
Process Model, previously mentioned, both include a Direct
function somewhere in their feedback loops. In using these
models, which are accurate within certain boundaries,
command and control for Battle Group operations has tended
to focus more on the development of command systems which
facilitate direct communications and control between the OTC
and his subordinates, resulting in an emphasis on more and
more sophisticated communications and information processing
systems. These systems are increasingly more complex to
operate and maintain, and are more costly to develop and
install. They also, in the author's opinion, have another
drawback. In any communications or information system
encountered by author or her contemporaries, the amount of
message traffic or data transmitted via the net or network
has always expanded to meet and, eventually, exceed the
capability of the system to handle it. The results are
delays between transmission and reception, loss of traffic
or data due to the sometimes vast amount of material sent
and/or received, and the concomitant problem of information
overload, discussed in Chapter 1.
In a combatant situation, Battle Group systems relying
on direct supervision via radio or satellite are
particularly vulnerable to the communications problems
detailed in Chapter 1, specifically damage to equipment,
jamming and interference and, in an exchange of nuclear
weapons, the effects of the electromagnetic pulse. Visual
communications are inadequate to the purpose, due to the
expansion of the naval battlefield which can be attributed
to increased ranges of weapons and the necessity of
separating units to preserve their viability.
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Any attempt to use only the mechanism of direct
supervision in naval warfare will also be frustrated by the
problems of information delay and/or overload, also
previously examined in this thesis. In the author's
experiences with exercises and wargames, which themselves
are tightly controlled, the amount of information in
tactical operations, when acted upon by a single commander,
will quickly exceed his ability to comprehend it. This
occurs most particularly when the mean time between events
(which will be referred to as MTBE) becomes shortened. This
MBTE is defined by the author as the average time between
occurrences, such as an identification of incoming missiles,
a possible submarine detection, the location of a hostile
surface action group, or continuing updates on any of these
and other tactical developments. Also contributing to the
problem is an increase in the level of task variability
(LTV), defined by Perrow and described in Chapter 3, which
causes an increase in coping difficulty. As the MTBE is
reduced and the LTV is increased, a single commander,
attempting to deal will all contingencies himself, will lose
the "big picture" in the myriad of details being reported to
him.
It has, of course, been recognized that a totally
centralized structure is inadequate to Battle Group
operations. The Combined Warfare Commander concept is
designed to distribute responsibility to subordinate
commanders, allowing the OTC to retain an overall
perspective of the battle and negate or guide the actions of
his subordinates. It is also recognized that, within
limits, the commanding officer of a vessel has the ultimate
responsibility for "fighting his ship" in any conflict. But
again, an officer who has experienced refresher training on
board a warship will have seen the confusion that can
develop when the Training Group "throws everything at" the
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crew. In such a situation, the captain and his Tactical
Action Officer (TAO) would still be unable to handle every
detail of the battle alone. Distributed throughout the
Combat Information Center (CIC) are officers and men
assigned to handle contingencies within some prescribed
limits. It is here that other coordinating mechanisms come
into play, each of which will be discussed.
B. MUTUAL COORDINATION
When responsibility for specific warfare tasks within a
Battle Group is delegated, mutual coordination is required
between those to whom the tasks are assigned. This
coordination may be necessary for allocation of resources,
such as ships, aircraft, or weapons and sensor systems. It
also must be present to prevent accidents; for example, ship
collisions or taking friendly aircraft under fire upon their
return to the group. On a lower level, when force efforts
must be concentrated or when there are overlapping regions
of responsibility, such as sectors, coordination between
individual ship commanders becomes a must, to prevent both
duplication of effort and/or interference. A similar
situation exists between aircraft in flight, or individuals
aboard a ship who are defending it from attack.
Between commanders of separate Battle Groups,
subordinate warfare commanders, and physically separate
units, mutual coordination suffers from the some of the same
drawbacks of direct supervision. Specifically, such
coordination requires communications; between groups or
warfare commanders, it will usually require radio or
satellite communications. Individual units will also
require radio, unless they are close enough to communicate
visually, a situation that may not exist due to the
expansion of the modern naval battlefield.
The pace of the battle may also degrade the ability of
the Battle Group to use mutual coordination. It is the
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author's belief that, when the MTBE is shortened and the LTV
is increased, the quality of interaction between commanders
at all levels is reduced. There is less time for one
commander to fully inform another of his intentions, if at
all. The natural brevity of the information transmitted may
lead to misunderstanding, confusion and interference.
When mutual coordination between commanders or units is
required to concentrate forces against a multiple threats,
additional problems may develop. When one commander
perceives one threat, an incoming air attack for example, to
be the paramount threat to the group, he may call for
assistance or additional resources. Another commander may
not share his concern, believing action against a submarine
threat to be more imperative. Mutual coordination alone may
not be sufficient to solve the conflict in resource
allocation and Battle Group posture. Again, additional
methods of control will be required.
C. STANDARDIZATION OF OUTPUT
Standardization of output, as previously defined, is the
specification of the mission and/or objectives of an
operation. Its use as a method of coordination is based on
complete dissemination and understanding of the mission
throughout the force. It is also a multi-layered mechanism,
as the overall Battle Group mission is supported by the many
lesser missions, or more precisely, objectives which are
assigned to separate divisions or units of the force.
The assignment of the objectives to members of the force
may be made at many different points during the tactical
operation. For example, during the planning stage of an
operation the missions of anti-submarine warfare, anti-air
warfare and anti-surface warfare are assigned by the OTC to
specific subordinate commanders. Each commander will be
given parameters within which they are to operate, and
requirements for contact prosecution based on conditions
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such as distance from the force center or the perceived
threat axis. The conduct of operations to achieve the
objective is up to the individual commander, within the
guidelines specified. Similarly, when a Surface Action
Group is detached from the main body to intercept and
investigate a target or when a reconnaissance flight is
launched during the period of actual operations, the
objective is defined and certain parameters delineated,
within which the commander of the SAG or reconn flight is
able to take what action he deems necessary.
The advantage of this mechanism of control becomes
apparent in fast-paced situations, where the MTBE begins to
shorten. When the individual decision-maker, at whatever
level, has received a clear understanding of the mission of
the force and his particular portion of it, he may
independently take any necessary action called for by the
situation, without being called upon to wait for an order
given by a single commander who may be overwhelmed by
reports and information. This decentralization of command
and control is not an unusual notion when examined within
reasonable limits. As Van Creveld points out, "there is not
a single member in any armed force at any time and place who
has not performed some of the functions of command for at
least part of the time." [ Ref . 2: p. 263] This method of
control is, of course, not without its drawbacks.
The problem that exists in the use of standardization of
output as it is defined here, is that the commander, at
whatever level, may not have the expertise or judgement to
make the necessary decisions to achieve the prescribed goal
under existing conditions. Additionally, this mechanism
rests upon a clear understanding at all levels of the
overall force objectives, and each individual's place within
the scheme of things. Failure to communicate fully his
portion of the mission and its relationship to the whole to
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each decision-maker, whether he is the ASW Watch Officer on
a frigate or the ASW commander directly subordinate to the
OTC, may result in a wrong decision and concomitant
interference with others in the Battle Group. Again, this
method alone will not solve the problems of command and
control in a modern tactical force.
D. STANDARDIZATION OF PROCESS
In the realm of military applications, standardization
of process has two applications. In one sense it is
training, defined within very specific limits. It is
operator training - how to use the equipment and/or tools
one is given. It can be multi-layered in the sense that an
officer learns how to "drive" a ship and his helmsman learns
to control the ship's rudder. It includes use of weapons
systems, as in training to operate and read a radar, use a
targeting system, or fire a missile. It does not include,
however, the training in how to "fight" a ship or aircraft,
or a group of ships and aircraft, intelligently. That
aspect of training will be discussed at a later point in
this thesis.
This is a necessary mechanism in command and control in
that when an order is given, for example, to acquire a
target and take it under fire, the order need not be so
detailed as to include every action on the part of the
operator of the weapon systems. The unit commander issuing
the order is aware that the operator is sufficiently trained
to execute his command in a correct and expeditious fashion.
This frees his time for examining other situations and
issuing additional orders. As one moves up the command
hierarchy, the same type of relationship exists between, for
example, the ASUW commander and one of the unit commanders
with assets which may be used in an anti-surface role. In
this and similar situations, however, the knowledge used by
the "operator" has moved into another dimension. There is a
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fine line dividing the two, but though both situations
involve training, the author feels the more advanced
situation has more to do with skill, and therefore has
placed it in the area of standardization of skills, in which
section it will be discussed.
The second application of standardization of process is
in the area of planning. Most members of the military are
familiar with the term or title Standard Operating
Procedures (SOPs). These are procedures which a command, or
group of commands, will execute in cases involving
identifiable, well-defined situations or contingencies.
They may cover a variety of differing problems. A ship may
have SOP's ranging from message distribution, emergency
destruction, issuing of emergency leave for crew members, or
the proper standing of a bridge watch; an example of the
last is the Captain's Standing Orders. Standard procedures
also may be incorporated for tactical situations. Within an
individual ship, training will have been conducted to
inculcate the proper methods of damage control when under
attack in order to prevent the spread of damage which may
render the ship unable to fight. In the case of carrier
aircraft, specific procedures also will have been
established for locating the carrier after a mission, making
contact and, if necessary, ditching.
In addition to the various SOP's available for guidance
in a tactical situation, there are also the plans specific
to that operation. Generally, these take the form of
operation plans, or OPPLAN's, which may cover a myriad of
details such as communications frequencies to be used,
contact reporting procedures, emission control requirements,
and the rules of engagement. Some portions of the plan may
be taken from standard operating procedures which have been
adapted to the situation or, where necessary, developed
specifically for the operation at hand.
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The advantage of this coordination mechanism is that the
OTC may be reasonably sure, when communications with his
subordinates are degraded or lost, or when he must
distribute his authority and responsbility due to
information processing problems caused by a reduced MBTE and
increased LTV, that his subordinate commanders have the
necessary guidelines to fight the battle. The SOP ' s and/or
OPPLAN can, indeed, be specific on what conditions will
automatically engender the transfer of authority. In
addition, as an aid to mutual coordination, the plan may
include a more or less specific listing of actions that the
commander has planned for the various units with the
approximate times for their execution. In the case of
aircraft strikes, this kind of information might prevent
incidents such as ships in the group taking returning
aircraft under fire before making a careful attempt to
identify them. The utility of the operation plan is, of
course, increased when it includes the type of varietal
planning detailed in Chapter 2 of this thesis. A
determination of the likely effects of disruption of command
and control, and the resulting confusion, should assist the
commander and his staff in planning for C2 contingencies.
The problem with both SOP ' s and operation plans is that
they can never cover the complete range of emergencies that
may develop in the course of a tactical operation. They
may, of course, provide a frame of reference within which a
course of action may be chosen, but by the same token, heavy
dependence upon written procedure may also inhibit the
military decision-maker from choosing a innovative, yet
effective, method which could achieve the desired goal. The
question then becomes, how may innovation in command be
encouraged, and still ensure a measure of control over the
actions of subordinates?
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E. STANDARDIZATION OF SKILLS
It is the author's belief that the answer to this
question lies in standardization of skills, to be achieved
by additional training; specifically, training in what the
Navy Command and Control Plan describes as doctrine:
Doctrine exerts a strong influence in the
decision-making task. Doctrine provides operational
commanders with decision and action guidelines for
response to a range of predictable tactical situations.
The importance of these guidelines is indicated in JCS
PUB 2: Common doctrine is essential for mutual
understanding and confidence between a commander and his
subordinates, and among the subordinates themselves, so
that timely and effective action will be taken by all
concerned in the absence of specific instructions.
"
[Ref. 13: p. 14]
The formulation of this doctrine is the result of the
subjection of decision guidelines and associated tactical
responses to extensive development and operational testing.
When it is accepted, it becomes the basis for defining
training requirements and performance standards for tactical
forces. The benefit to the commander is that it provides
him with a ready set of proven decision rules, for which his
troops are prepared from rehearsals in exercises [Ref. 13:
pp. 14-15].
The next question is, how are these rules developed and
tested, particularly for modern naval warfare, when this
country has not recently been involved in a conflict which
required true naval tactics? There are two means available,
one of which has been used as extensively as money and time
would permit, and the other is just beginning to come to the
fore. The first is, of course, naval exercises. The
exercise offers the most realistic means of developing
doctrine. Unfortunately, it is expensive in terms of the
fuel and other operating costs required to put a fleet of
ships to sea. In recent years, also, it has been viewed as
a less than realistic means of testing tactics, as the
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exercise may be so tightly controlled that the effects of
combat may not be "permitted to interfere" with the conduct
of the operation. One example of this, which has been said
to occur not infrequently, is the exercise commander's
refusal to allow his communications to be degraded. Under
such a restriction, command and control doctrine cannot be
tested, nor can new means of control be developed and
tested.
The other method is the military wargame. New computer
systems have made available games such as NWISS (Naval
Warfare Interactive Simulation System) and NAVTAG (Naval
Tactical Game), which allow naval officers at all levels of
command an opportunity to "fight" different naval scenarios
as a means of learning naval tactics and doctrine. Though
not truly realistic, more variables in the battle are
possible as software improves, allowing realistic
restrictions in fuel consumption, communications capability,
sensor utilization, and weapons operation. Though the
software is expensive, and sometimes laborious to develop,
once in place it provides a much less expensive, and more
flexible, means of testing doctrine than the fleet exercise.
It is also more forgiving, as a mistake in a wargame does
not have the permanence of one made in "real life. "
F. CONCLUSIONS
Naturally none of these mechanisms alone can provide an
answer to the problem of organizational command and control.
As was described in Chapter 3, a mix of the coordinating
mechanisms is usually necessary in order to provide adequate
control, particularly in an organization like the military,
which deals with a sometimes extremely dynamic, certainly
hostile, environment. How the mix works depends on how the
organization is defined along a "time line" of tactical
operations. The rest of this thesis will deal with that
time line, and with what the author refers to as the
Balanced Concept.
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V. A SYNTHESIS OF THE CONTROL METHODS FOR FLEET COMMAND
A. THE SIX PHASES OF TACTICAL ACTION
Before an analysis of the tactical application of the
five coordinating mechanisms can begin, a generic model of
the progress of a tactical operation must be established.
Because a tactical operation is evolutionary/ the model must
include some form of change over time. As mentioned in
Chapter 1 of this paper, most command and control models
involve a feedback loop of some kind--a static model of the
decision-making process. There have been some attempts to
modify such models into a time line, as in the [ Ref . 14: pp.
5-14, 5-15] , but such time lines are just a different method
of displaying the loop. These models do not show the
evolution of the various conditions under
.
which the
decisions may have to be made; in short, they divorce the
decision from the situation. What the author hopes to do,
is to design a situational model of tactical warfare to
which these decision loops, or other models of control and
coordination, may be applied.
The author's model is called the Six Phases of Tactical
Action, and is similar in structure to a time line, though
without specific demarcations or time limits. Specifically,
it defines the approximate relationship between six
identifiable phases of tactical warfare over time. These
phases, with temporal relationships as shown in Figure 5. 1,
are as follows:
1. Training Phase (made up of both Peacetime and Hostile
components)
2. Planning and Preparation Phase
3. Transit Phase
4. Contact Phase
5. High Intensity Phase









Figure 5. 1 The Six Phases of Tactical Action.
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What must be emphasized about the diagram, is that no
one phase occurs exactly as pictured with relation to
another; it occurs approximately at that point along a time
line which runs roughly from the inception of an operation
to the termination of hostilities. The phases may be seen
as forming a loop as a force moves from one operation to the
next, or the progression from phase to phase may be
interrupted due to one or the other force commanders'
decision to withdraw from the battle; for example, if the
enemy force commander should withdraw to a more advantageous
position, the phase progression could interpreted as Contact
Phase—Transit Phase—Contact Phase. It should also be
stressed that more than one phase may be occuring
simultaneously at two different locations, i.e. , in the
world, in a force made up of multiple battle groups, or even
within a single battle group. For example, the contact
phase of ASW action may occur during the resolution and
recovery phase of AAW action; yet to the OTC, the overall
situation is still in the high intensity phase. In this
thesis, the author will be speaking of the model in a
general context, occasionally using specific examples to
demonstrate its applicability. Discussion of the model will
begin with the Training Phase.
B. THE TRAINING PHASE
As previously mentioned, the Training Phase is made up
of two separate components, peacetime and hostile. There
are some similarities between the two. Both deal with
training for new accessions, instruction in equipment use
and operation, and education in various methods of tactical
or strategic warfare. Their primary differences are in
tempo and overall training emphasis.
It can be argued that peacetime training is not truly a
part of tactical action, as it is general in nature. The
author believes it must be included, as the foundations laid
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during peacetime training have far-reaching effects during
any period of hostilities; one cannot prepare for war only
when it begins. Similarly, training during the hostile
phase is not always operation-specific, but in its earlier
stages fulfills much the same function as peacetime
training, within narrower limits.
The peacetime training component is characterized by
general training and readiness. There is no specific
opponent, or opponents, in mind as the object of training,
though one or more entities may be considered a primary
threat. For example, though the United States may presently
consider the Soviet Union its primary antagonist during the
the present period of relative peace, military training is
not restricted to dealing with the USSR alone. It includes
preparation for situations involving localized conflicts,
terrorist actions, or peace-keeping missions. The tempo of
peacetime training is slower, as there are no strategic or
reserve mobilization deadlines to be met, and requirements
for training of replacements is limited to normal accessions
due to discharges or retirements. At the same time, the
emphasis on control of costs characteristic of periods of
calm usually results in the frequency of certain types of
training ( such as exercises) or numbers of individuals
selected for additional training ( an example is specialized
schools) is reduced. In general, the emphasis in the
peacetime training phase is on readiness for any possible
contingency.
In contrast, the hostile component of the training phase
is typified by greater urgency and specificity. It may
begin with either a declaration of hostilities, as in the
case of a localized conflict or anti-terrorist action, or
with a general buildup of tensions, where an opponent and
his allies become progressively more open with their hostile
intent. In either case, a specific range of opponents is
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identified, along with the probable geography of
hostilities. Training becomes concentrated on actions and
techniques which may be employed by or upon the antagonist;
briefly, one comes to "know one's enemy" and how best to
fight him. The tempo of training steps up as any necessary
mobilization of reserve forces begins, and as specific
strategic objectives are set, training for operations to
achieve those objectives starts. Cost becomes less of a
control over training requirements, and if time, security,
and available supplies allows, any required exercises or
operation rehearsals will be conducted.
It is the hostile training phase that has overlaps with
others of the six phases of tactical action, due to the
inclusion in this component of training for specific
tactical operations. Preparation for an individual naval or
land battle continues up to the moment of contact with the
enemy; part of that preparation is training. But before any
operation-specific training can begin, the strategic and
tactical objectives must be chosen, and the plan for goal
achievement be made.
C. THE PLANNING AND PREPARATION PHASE
The Planning, and Preparation Phase of tactical warfare
begins with the selection of a force mission or missions.
This could be considered the real starting point of tactical
action. In a large-scale operation, it is initiated at a
much higher level than that at which it will be carried out,
in fact, at the strategic level of command. As planning
continues, lower levels of command will progressively become
more involved in the selection of objectives or targets, and
in operation plan development. During this phase, the mean
time between events (or MTBE, as it has previously been
defined) is, in most cases, of a duration which allows more
thorough examination of alternatives and specific planning.
Relative to later phases, the MTBE here is longer than at
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any other time. Conversely, the level of task variability
(or LTV) should be based upon future expectations, in order
to ensure a sufficient number of routine, or standardized,
procedures are prepared to deal with the variety of tasks
that may be encountered in combat.
It is during this phase that commanders at various
levels, and their staffs, produce, select, and/or modify the
operations plans, standard operating procedures, and
standing orders that will govern the conduct of the
operation. They will also be responsible for ensuring that
logistics preparations are thorough; for example, is it
possible for the force to carry all its supplies, or will
sources and locations for resupply have to be selected and
prepositioned? The key problem during this period is
ensuring that there is full communication among planners
within and between the commands and staffs, in order to
ensure that the force mission is understood at all levels,
that all necessary expertise is brought to bear in order to
select alternatives, and that problems of coordination and
interoperability are kept to a minimum. In situations
involving a large operation, with a high mix of forces, this
phase could be the most crucial, and the one in which the
greatest mistakes can be made.
The planning and preparation phase will also include any
rehearsals or exercises of the plan. If the operation time
line permits, such a rehearsal is invaluable in determining
possible plan weaknesses and problems of interoperability or
coordination that were overlooked by the planning
organization. These rehearsals may take place prior to
force embarkation, or during transit to the objective area.
In either case, the surfacing of significant problems will
result in changes to the OPPLAN.
The planning and preparation phase may be considered to
continue up until the point of contact with the enemy, as
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modifications or updates to a plan may still be issued by
the OTC or his subordinate warfare commanders until that
time. After enemy contact is established, and the
engagement begins, any necessary modifications to a plan are
the result of directives for immediate implementation,
rather than planned changes.
At some point during the planning and preparation phase,
the force will begin movement toward the objective area.
This phase is called the transit phase.
D. THE TRANSIT PHASE
The Transit Phase begins with force embarkation and
continues until the objective area is reached, or until the
enemy is engaged. Contact with or engagement of a single
aircraft or scouting ship does not end the transit phase,
however. Location and engagement of the more substantial
part of the force to which the single unit belongs, however,
does constitute the end of the contact phase. This phase is
characterized by continuing search operations, minimization
of actions which may give away force position, and
intensified training in the force mission and plan
execution. As emission control (EMCON) is usually enforced
to prevent detection of the force due to electromagnetic
emissions, communications will be reduced to visual signals
and a minimum of, if any, radio signals.
As the force draws closer to the objective area, the
MTBE will probably decrease as search operations are
increased, and preparations are made for any pre-planned
actions. In the case of a carrier air strike, aircraft will
be prepared and loaded, aviators will be thoroughly briefed,
and ship's personnel will take station for flight operations
and prepare for possible retaliatory action. In an
amphibious landing, preparations will be made for naval
gunfire and air strikes, landing craft will be prepared for
launch, surveillance of the landing area will be conducted,
and troops will be stationed for craft loading and launch.
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The transit phase may begin very slowly, with a very low
operations tempo, depending upon the distance of the
embarkation point from the expected area of operations. As
previously mentioned, it may include modification of the
operation plans or, in case of a contingency developing
elsewhere in the world, a complete change in the force
mission. Generally, it is a period of waiting, when the
force begins to build itself to its peak--refining the plan,
ensuring readiness for contingencies, training the troops,
and looking for the enemy. It can also be a shortened
period, particularly when the enemy is in close proximity to
the area of embarkation, or positioned in the path to the
force objective area. In this case, the MTBE may be reduced
abruptly, and the plan modified at its very inception. In
either case, the transit period ends with enemy contact.
E. THE CONTACT PHASE
The Contact Phase begins with the. first sighting of an
enemy contact. The MTBE is immediately shortened, and the
LTV increased, as action is taken to subject the contact(s)
and the surrounding area to more intense surveillance, take
the enemy under fire, or respond to an incoming attack which
has been detected, depending upon the nature of the initial
contact. The MTBE and the LTV continue their respective
downward and upward trends as the detection and
identification of further enemy forces continues, and force
actions are determined and implemented. The contact phase
continues until all, or nearly all, enemy forces are
identified, or any additional contacts encountered are not
expected to continue the battle. For this reason, the
contact phase may sometimes be considered to extend into the
period of battle resolution and recovery; the author feels,
however, that virtually all hostile forces in the battle
area would be identified at a point earlier in the high
intensity period of the conflict.
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During this phase, EMCON conditions will become
progressively more relaxed as hiding force location and
preventing unit identification becomes less imperative.
Communications and sensor availability will increase, with
the exception of radiations which might allow targeting of
the high value unit(s), such as the aircraft carrier or
other flagships. By the same token, enemy electronic
counter measures (ECM) and initial damage to friendly units
may begin to degrade the use of electronic equipment even as
it becomes available.
It is at this point that the Training and
Planning/Preparation phases end, as any "education" gained
by personnel during the following activities would come
under the category of experience, and any modifications or
extensions of operation plans would be the result of
immediate evaluation, selection and execution, rather than
full analysis, dissemination and testing.
Depending upon the scope of the battle and the relative
strengths of the forces engaged, the contact phase could
pass almost directly into a period of resolution and
recovery. This pre-supposes that one force is
overwhelmingly more successful than the other, due to either
superior numbers or superior skill. The author contends
that such an imbalance is very rarely the case, and that in
order to provide a complete model for tactical warfare, the
contact phase must pass into a period of high intensity
action.
F. THE HIGH INTENSITY PHASE
The High Intensity Phase is so named because of the
level of action taking place. In this phase the MTBE is
reduced to its lowest level, with the result that there is
less time available to spend on information reporting, and
subsequent processing of information received is degraded by
the shortened time line. By the same token, the LTV peaks,
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and the individual commanders, at many levels, begin to
experience a decline in their ability to comprehend, and
cope with, the battle. Additionally, the use of electronic
countermeasures and/or damage from successive attacks begin
to severely reduce the communications capability of the
force. If tactical nuclear weapons are employed, loss of
communications and sensors may be virtually, if not
actually, total, due to the effects of radiation and the
electromagnetic pulse (EMP).
At the same time, any number of unexpected events, such
as loss of assets, underestimation of enemy forces and
capabilities, or inaccurate prediction of weather effects,
may make it difficult, impossible, or inadvisable for
elements of the force to carry out their portion of the
mission. In this situation the plan may be altered, and at
several possible levels. In a naval scenario, the OTC, one
of his subordinate warfare commanders, or any of a number of
unit commanders may have to order and/or carry out a
deviation from preplanned actions in order to meet an
assigned objective. Unfortunately, such alterations may
cause further confusion when other members of the force are
not informed of the change and are not able to interpret the
intended result from any actions they observe their
counterparts executing. The probability of mutual
interference grows commensurately.
G. THE RESOLUTION AND RECOVERY PHASE
At some point, one or both forces will have begun to
lose their capability to continue the battle, due to damage,
personnel exhaustion, a reduction in force numbers, and/or a
decrease in the choice of actions available. As this
occurs, the MTBE lengthens, the ability of the individual
commander to comprehend events increases commensurately, and
he begins to attempt to re-marshal and re-organize his
forces. At this point, the battle moves into the Resolution
and Recovery Phase.
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The resolution and recovery phase is characterized by a
withdrawal from the scene of action by one or both of the
opposing forces. Damage assessments are made, and actions
are implemented at all levels to repair what can be
repaired, compensate for what cannot, and control the
further spread of damage. Communications circuits which
have been degraded due to ECM, but not lost to battle
damage, will be available for the commander's use in
obtaining situation reports from the units under his
command. As the MTBE increases and the LTV decreases, there
is a concurrent increase in the individual commander's
ability to process information, will allow the OTC to take
direct control of his units as necessary, and give orders
for reconnaissance of the opposing force, "mopping up"
actions, and/or withdrawal of part or all of his force. The
OTC will begin comprehensive reporting to his superiors
outside the force, and begin preparations for further
operations, if indeed these have not already begun. By
this, it can be seen that at or near the completion of the
resolution and recovery phase, the tactical process returns
to the planning and preparation phase of a new operation.
H. SUMMARY
The effects of the six phases of a tactical operation
can be summarized briefly in the following manner. There
must be a period of training prior to the initiation of an
operation, in order to ensure that each individual is
familiar with his equipment, its operation, and its function
in warfare. The initiation of an operation begins slowly,
with a period of as deliberate and careful planning and
preparation as is possible in the time allotted. Once the
force is embarked, the transit period begins, with a steady
increase in operations tempo which continues through enemy
contact and identification, and peaks at some point during
the battle, decreasing thereafter as the force begins
57
reconstitution. As the tempo increases, the volume of
information also increases, and the ability of individual
commanders to comprehend the battle decreases. As the force
approaches the enemy, communications are lost due to the
effects of ECM, and continue to be degraded during the
battle due to damage to communications equipment.
In the face of these assumptions, the question becomes
what methods of control can ensure that the problems of
communications degradation and information processing do not
prevent the force from achieving its mission. No method is
absolute, but it is the author's contention that in order to
provide for the variety of problems, a variety of solutions
must be built in to the organization. A mixture of the
coordinating mechanisms defined in Chapter 4 can provide a
measure of flexibility to meet the problems of tactical
command and control. This is not to imply that these
methods have not been used in the past, but that this thesis
will offer a model by which they can be defined and made
available for conscious application and analysis. The
author calls this model the Balanced Concept.
I. CONTROL DURING THE SIX PHASES- -THE BALANCED CONCEPT
The Balanced Concept is based upon the idea that no one
mechanism of organizational control is sufficient in an
environment as actively hostile as that of a military unit
in combat. Additionally, no one method could be considered
optimum throughout the progress of a tactical operation
which, for the purposes of this thesis, the author has
defined as the Six Phases of Tactical Action. The author
contends that a mixture of Mintzberg's coordinating
mechanisms, defined within a military context, provides a
means of "getting around" the limitations of technology as
defined in Chapter 1.
The "balance" in the Balanced Concept lies not so much
in the use of Mintzberg's mechanisms in combat as in their
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availability for use. In other words, the force and its
resources must be structured to ensure that all five methods
are present so that, when necessary, they may be used in
battle. Relating this to Ashby's and Burton's work in
variety, a balance in the organization of the five
coordinating mechanisms provides the "flexible configuration
strategy" which permits the force to respond to the variety
of stimuli which may be encountered in combat. Also related
to Burton's work as discussed in Chapter 2, the author
believes that these methods take into account production
processes (OPLANs, SOPs and operator training), individual
capabilities (skills), production inputs (defined by the
author as the force itself), production outputs (achievement
of the mission objectives), and organizational structure
(within which the author places direct supervision and
mutual coordination). Thus, the organization is configured
for variety in its attempt to deal with the contingencies of
command and control. A way in which the coordinating
mechanisms may be imposed on the six phases of a tactical
operation is demonstrated in Figure 5. 2.
How and when each method is implemented for use during
the operation is a function of the context of the battle,
and the level to which each method may contribute to an
overall measure of command and control effectiveness. It
may also be a function of the force commander's personal
style as, in fact, different mixtures of the coordinating
mechanisms may produce an equal level of command and control
effectiveness in the same tactical situation. The point
here is that the effectiveness of any one method should be
related to an overall measure of C2 effectiveness. The
reader is here referred to such works as the report of the
Command and Control Evaluation Workshop [ Ref . 14] for
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Figure 5. 2 The Balanced Concept.
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Application of the Balanced Concept for control of
tactical warfare begins in the training phase, with
standardization of skills and process. This is not to say
that the other methods of control are not used here, but
that they do not apply within the context of a direct
relationship with a tactical operation. They are used
primarily as administrative controls over logistics,
maintenance and training during this phase. Standardization
of skills and process, however, begin here as training that
will carry over into the future—into the tactical
operation. Without this kind of preparation in peacetime
and, during the hostile component, prior to an operation,
nothing could be accomplished without minute, specific,
on-the-spot instructions.
With the beginning of the hostile component, direct
supervision comes into play. The author chooses this point
in time for the inception of direct control based on the
belief that, once a period of tensions or hostilities
begins, the operational chain of command will take priority,
and there will be as few a number of reassignment's of units
as possible. In other words, the combatant organization
will be stabilized, with the exception of replacements due
to attrition. As previously discussed, the training phase
continues concurrently with the planning and preparation
phase, where the last of the coordinating mechanisms enter
the mix.
It is in the planning phase that standardization of
output enters in, as a mission objective(s) for the
operation is selected. As this phase progresses, the
objective(s) will be disseminated throughout the various
levels of the force. The second component of
standardization of process also is generated here, as the
operation plans, standard procedures, and standing orders
are composed, selected, and disseminated. Mutual
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coordination should become evident during the planning
process, as the various subordinate commanders, their
staffs, and even unit commanders become involved in the
production of the operation plans. Direct supervision
continues through this phase, as does the operator training
component of process standardization, and the
standardization of worker skills. It must be emphasized
here that throughout this phase, no coordinating mechanism
should be degraded unless human error causes it to be. In
reality, of course, the factor of human error will cause
some failures, but for the purpose of defining the model,
this factor will be considered minimal.
As the operation moves into the transit phase, all five
methods of coordination remain available for the use of the
force. In this case, however, direct supervision and mutual
coordination begin to rely upon communications via radio
and/or visual means, and up-to-date information on enemy
forces is obtained via sensor assets. As EMCON is likely to
be enforced, there is some restriction on the use of both
radio and sensors, but as these restrictions are
self-imposed, the availability at this point of direct
supervision and mutual coordination as methods of control is
considered normal. Standardization of skills and output
also remain, as does the operator training component of
standardization of process. The plans and procedures
component may be subject to updates and changes during this
period, but is also considered to be in effect.
All of these methods will remain effective into the
first part of contact phase, where jamming and other methods
of ECM will begin to reduce the use of communications,
resulting in a degradation of control by direct supervision
and mutual coordination. It is at this point that control
by standardization of process and skills comes to the fore,
with standardization of output driving their use. As the
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operation moves into the high intensity phase, direct
supervision and mutual coordination may be so reduced as to
be eliminated, as damage to communications and sensor
equipment, combined with continued ECM, makes transmission
of information and orders to subordinate and lateral
commanders virtually impossible. Also during this phase,
operation plans may forcibly and unexpectedly be altered to
deal with unforeseen contingencies, such as unexpected
losses or inadequate intelligence on enemy capabilities. In
such a case, the alteration of operations plans will rest
upon one or more of the other coordinating mechanisms; for
example, changes may be the result of direct supervision, in
which the overall commander concentrates his efforts upon
the generation of feasible alternatives. If direct
supervision is so degraded that the OTC is unable to provide
the necessary direction, commanders at all levels will of
necessity revert to standardization of skills and output as
methods of coordination.
Standardization of skills should remain unaffected
during the high intensity phase. Assuming training was
based upon the best knowledge available about the enemy,
limitations upon this method of control become dependent
upon prior intelligence and its incorporation into the
training program. If, during the battle, the enemy is
discovered to have new weapons or tactics of a kind
revolutionary enough to make past doctrine inapplicable,
standardization of skills will rest upon the individual
commander's ability to innovate on the spot. In this
situation, standardization of output remains effective, as
achievement of the mission objective( s) , by hook or by
crook, will govern the commander's actions. Operator
training also exists as long as the equipment is functional.
As the operation moves into the resolution and recovery
phase, those methods of control which have suffered
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degradation will be reconstituted along with the force.
Direct supervision and mutual coordination will be restored
in a manner directly related to the restoral of battle group
communications. Standardization of output exists, insofar
as mission instructions included "mop-up" operations and
force reconsitution, but loses much of its impact as the
operation is completed. Standardization of skills and of
process are also effective, as damage control, maintenance
and search and rescue procedures continue, and plans for
force rendezvous, operation follow-up, and repair and
resupply are initiated and carried out.
When viewed along a time continuum, as in Figure 5.2,
the supplemental nature of the five coordinating mechanisms
is more evident than in verbal description. Unfortunately,
as can be seen in the diagram, four out of the five may
suffer from some form of degradation during the high
intensity portion of combat. What is to be hoped, is that a
combination of all of them can make up for the individual
failures in each, and that those that remain effective can
bolster the force's overall effectiveness. For example, as
direct supervision and mutual coordination become degraded
due " to failures in the ability of senior commanders to
adequately process information, many decision-making
functions will be decentralized. In such a case, the
operation plans and the skills of lower-level commanders
must function to reinforce the control process. Conversely,
if the enemy's actions are so unexpected or innovative as to
be beyond the tactical skills of the commmanders or to make
the plan infeasible, direct intervention by the OTC would
provide a method for controlling the situation. In other
words, the OTC concentrates his attention on the big
picture, dealing directly only with those situations his
subordinates are unable to handle.
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In this thesis, the Six Phases of Tactical Action and
the five mechanisms of the Concept have been applied to the
operation of a Fleet Battle Group. It is the author's
contention that this same process can be applied to other
forms of tactical warfare, with modifications to suit each
situation. First, the six phases provide a method of
defining the logical progression and characteristics of an
operation, whether it be an amphibious landing or an
air-land battle. Second, the superimposition of the five
coordination mechanisms, in a mixed application, can allow
the force's strengths and weaknesses in organizational
control to be determined. Further analysis may, in fact,
permit the identification of corrective measures for any
weaknesses described. The author hopes that, at the very
least, this model offers a descriptor of the most critical
period in tactical command and control--the high intensity
phase of combat--and has initiated a new orientation from
which it may be viewed in order to find more innovative
solutions.
Future work includes the design and development of a
technique to relate a specific battle evolution to the
Balanced Concept. In such a research effort a primary area
for evaluation includes an analysis of the relation of each
coordinating mechanism and the mutual reinforcement of all
five which contributes to overall force effectiveness. Over
a variety of specific evolutions such an effort will present
an understanding of the choice of mix of the five mechanisms
contingent on the evolution. Such an understanding would
provide a basis for the relative emphasis to be placed on
each mechanism during training and exercises. In addition
the adaptation of the mix during a specific battle evolution




1. Whaley, W. S. , Command and Control of Battle Groups,"
Memorandum for the Record, Office of the Chief of
Naval Operations, 18 May 1979.
2. Van Creveld, Martin, Command in War , Harvard
University Press, 1985.
3. Orr, George E. , Combat Operations C3I : Fundamentals
and Interactions , Air University Press, Maxwell Air
Force Base, Alabama, July 1983.
4. Bass, Bernard M. , Organizational Decision Making ,
Richard D. Irwin, Inc." 1983.
5. Fitts, Richard E. , ed. , The Strategy of
Lla Publishing, 1980.
6.
Electromagnetic Conflict . Peninsui
Rotblat, Joseph, Nuclear Radiation in Warfare , Taylor
and Francis, Ltd. ~ 1981.
7. Glasstone, Samuel, ed. , The Effects of Nuclear
Weapons , US Atomic Energy Commission, April~~T962.
8. Ashby, W. Ross, An Introduction to Cybernetics , John
Wiley and Sons, Inc." 1956.
9. Defense Systems, Inc. , Elements of C2 Theory, prepared
for Contract DCA100-84-C-UU477 Headquarters
Effectiveness Evaluation, Defense Communications
Agency, 15 October 1985.
Burton, Richard M. , Variety in Planning. An
Alternative to the Problem Solving Approach, The
Columbia Journal of World Business , Vol. XIX, No. 4,
11. Mintzberg, Henry, The Structuring of Organizations , A
Synthesis of the Research , Prentice-Hall, Inc. , 19/9.
12. Ein-Dor, Phillip and Carl R. Jones, Information
Systems Management , Analytical Tools and Techniques ,
Elsevier Science Publishing Co.
,
Inc. , 1985.
13. Navy Command and Control Plan , Appendix C, NCCS
Functional Description , Office of the Chief of Naval
Operations, OP-094, September 1980.
66
14. Metersky, Morton, et. al. , Command and Control
Evaluation Workshop . MORS C2 MOE WorksEop, Naval
Postgraduate School, November 1985.
67
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Cardwell, Thomas A. , Command Structure for Theater Warfare ,
Air University Press, 1984.
Galbraith, Jay, Designing: Complex Organizations ,
Addi son-Wesley Publishing Company, 1973.
Galbraith, Jay R. , Organization Design , Addi son-Wesley
Publishing Co. , 1977.
Galbraith, Jay R. and Daniel A. Nathanson, Strategy
Implementation ; The Role of Structure and Process, West
Publishing Co. , 19~78~.
Ivanov, D. A. , et. al. , Fundamentals of Tactical Command and
Control, A Soviet View , translated and published by the US
Air Force, ~1WTT.
Schlesinger, Robert J. , Principles of Electronic Warfare ,
Peninsula Publishing, 1961.
van Aken. Joan Ernst, On the Control of Complex Industrial




1. Defense Technical Information Center 2
Cameron Station
Alexandria, Virginia 22304-6145
2. Library, Code 0142 2
Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey,. California 93943-5002
3. Defense Systems, Incorporated 1
Attn: Dr. Conrad Strack
7903 Westpark Drive
McLean, Virginia 22102
4. Dr. Michael G. Sovereign, Code 74 1
Chairman, C3 Academic Group
Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, California 93943-5000




6. Dr. James Wayman, Code 53WW 1
Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, California 93943-5000
7. Dr. Carson Eoyang, Code 54EG 1
Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, California 93943-5000
8. CDR Joseph S. Stewart, Code 55ST 1
Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, California 93943-5000
9. Joint C3 Curricular Office, Code 39 1
Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, California 93943-5000
10. LT Anneliese L. Kennedy 2
Naval Ocean Systems Center
San Diego, California 92152-5000
69
U 5




Thesis
K3654
c.l
217^67
Comirfand and control
/One Fleet Battle
roup an organization-
al approach.

